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ANALYSIS OF JOB-TRAINING EFFECTS ON KOREAN WOMEN
MYOUNG-JAE LEEa* AND SANG-JUN LEEb
a School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Singapore
b Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training, Seoul, South Korea
SUMMARY
We analyse job-training effects on Korean women for the period January 1999 to March 2000, using a large
data set of size about 52,000. We employ a number of estimation techniques: Weibull MLE and accelerated
failure time approach, which are both parametric; Cox partial likelihood estimator, which is semiparametric;
and two pair-matching estimators, which are in essence nonparametric. All of these methods gave the common
conclusion that job training for Korean women increased their unemployment duration. The trainings were
not cost-effective in the sense that they took too much time ‘locking in’ the trainees during the training span,
compared with the time they took to place the trainees afterwards. Despite this negative finding, some sub-
groups had positive effects: white-collar workers trained for finance/insurance or information/communication.
Copyright  2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1. INTRODUCTION
Job training has a long history for many developed countries. In Korea, job training was almost
negligible before the financial crisis during 1997–1998 which drove many people out onto the
street unemployed. This led to the first ever large-scale job training in Korea, and since then job
training has been the mainstay in the Korean government’s strategy to cope with unemployment.
Given the amount of money poured into job training in many countries, the importance of job
training needs no justification, and there are various methods available these days to evaluate
job-training effects [see, for example, Angrist and Krueger (1999), Heckman et al. (1999) and
references cited therein].
The goal of this paper is to assess job-training effects on Korean women by comparing a
treatment group d D 1 of job-trained women with a control group d D 0 of women who
received unemployment insurance benefit instead of job training. Specifically, we will examine
whether the training shortens or not the unemployment duration. In doing so, we address three
issues. First, the duration is censored for some women. Second, the training may shorten the
duration for some women while lengthening it for some others, in which case we have to define
what ‘training effect’ means. Third, with these two issues present, there are many different ways
to estimate job-training effects; one would like to know which is better, or whether the different
methods yield the same conclusion or not.
Let yji be the ‘potential response’ when the treatment d D j, j D 0, 1, is ‘exogenously given
to’ individual i. For individual i, only one of y1i and y0i is observed, and the realized response
variable is yi  diy1i C 1  diy0i. In our data, yji is unemployment duration, which is censored
for those who remain still unemployed when the data survey ended. We posit that there exists a
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censoring time, say ci, and the observed response ti is
ti D minyi, ci D mindiy1i C 1  diy0i, ci
Although the calendar censoring timing (the data the data survey ended) is the same for all
individuals, since the individuals entered the data at different time points, ci varies across i.
Define a no-censoring indicator qi  1[yi  ci] where 1[A] D 1 if A holds and 0 otherwise. We
have data on
di, qi, ti, xi, i D 1, . . . , N, iid across i 1
where xi is a covariate vector. Other than xi affecting yji, we can think of unobserved variables
affecting yji, denoted as uji, j D 0, 1 or just ui if u1i D u0i. Since duration happens over time,
some covariates can be time-variant, but in our data, none are. In view of the iid assumption, we
will often omit the subscript i indexing individuals. Assume that
ci is independent of di, xi, y0i, y1i 2
as usually done in duration analysis. This may not hold if the macroeconomic condition changes
much during the survey period, because ci depends on the timing of job loss.
The so-called ‘mean treatment effect’ is
Ey1  y0 D Ey1 Ey0
If d is uncorrelated with y0 and y1, then the mean treatment effect is the same as the ‘group
mean difference’ Eyjd D 1 Eyjd D 0. The condition CORd, yj D 0, j D 0, 1, holds easily
if d is randomized as in clinical trials. In our data, d is not randomized but self-selected by
individuals. Thus, the treatment group (‘T group’) can be different at a pre-treatment stage from
the control group (‘C group’), and the difference may be in x or in u0 and u1. This difference
should be eliminated; otherwise, we may mistake the effects of these differences as the effects of
the treatment difference. The difference in x may cause an ‘overt bias’, and the difference in u0
or u1 may cause a ‘hidden bias’. Most effort in treatment effect analysis with observational data
is spent on eliminating these biases.
Overt bias can be removed by conditioning on x : instead of the unconditional group mean
difference, look at the conditional group mean difference
Eyjx, d D 1 Eyjx, d D 0 D Ey1jx, d D 1 Ey0jx, d D 0 D Ey1jx Ey0jx
where the last equality holds if
yj, j D 0, 1, are independent of d given x 3
This is a ‘no-selection-bias’ assumption, which assumes away hidden bias. Without this assump-
tion, essentially, we need an instrument for d to deal with hidden bias. But instruments do not
come easy, and we do not have any plausible instrument for d in our data. The no-selection-bias
assumption will be maintained throughout this paper.
Once the conditional effect Ey1  y0jx is identified, we can get an x-weighted average
(‘marginal effect’) ∫ Ey1  y0jxωxdx, where ωx is a weighting function. The natural choice
for ωxdx is dF (x ), where F is the distribution function for x.
Copyright  2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Appl. Econ. 20: 549–562 (2005)
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When can we declare job training a success? There could be many different opinions on this
question, but we can think of at least two criteria: unemployment duration and post-training wage.
Unfortunately, in our data, post-training wage comes from the survey respondents’ recollection,
which is unreliable, while pre-training wage comes from the tax authority, which is reliable. Thus,
in this paper, we will examine only unemployment duration. Focusing on unemployment duration
only, a large proportion (71%) of which is censored in our data, we can think of a couple of
different ways to characterize the training success, and the estimation method differs depending
on which is looked at. We show three different measures of training success that will be used in
this paper.
First, as a variation of the mean effect, consider the ‘proportional effect’
Eflny1 lny0jxg D Efln1 C y1  y0/y0jxg ' Efy1  y0/y0jxg 4
Using lny1 and lny0 instead of y1 and y0 gives a proportional measure of treatment effect,
getting rid of the scale in the response variable. The scale is also removed if Ey1  y0jx/Ey0jx
is used, as in Lee and Kobayashi (2001). But Eflny1 lny0jxg has an additional attraction: we
can analyse duration in an ‘accelerated failure time framework’, where ln(duration) is specified as
a linear function of d and x ; if one follows the more popular ‘hazard-based’ duration approaches,
estimating equation (4) would not be straightforward.
Under censoring, the accelerated failure time approach requires specifying the distribution
function for ln(duration) given x ; we will use the normal distribution. For the sake of comparison,
two well-known hazard-based approaches, the Weibull maximum likelihood estimator and the Cox
partial likelihood estimator, will be used as well. The latter is semiparametric in that it does not
fully specify the distribution of duration given x.
Second, instead of running the risk of misspecifying the model to estimate equation (4) under
censoring, we may nonparametrically estimate
Eflnyjx, d D 1, q D 1g  Eflnyjx, d D 0, q D 1g
D Eflny1jx, y1  cg  Eflny0jx, y0  cg 5
under conditions (2) and (3); the condition q D 1 is to select only the non-censored observations.
To control for x nonparametrically, we will do ‘matching’, which will be reviewed in section 4.
In equation (5), censored observations are not used, which is a loss of information.
When we say ‘no effect’, it can mean many different things; e.g., when median or quantile
effects are used as in Lee (2000), no effect means no median or quantile effects. In equation (4),
no effect means no change in E (ln(response)), which can happen even if y0 6D y1. The most strict
version of no effect requires y0 D y1. Under this strict version, equation (5) becomes zero. But
when y0 6D y1 is allowed under no effect, equation (5) may not be zero, and is hard to interpret
differently from equation (4) due to the conditioning events y1  c and y0  c.
Third, as just noted, equation (5) has two shortcomings of ignoring the censored observations
and being hard to interpret. To overcome these problems, instead we may take
Py1  jx > Py0  jx for some  6
as a measure of training success for the sub-population characterized by x. Imagine two groups of
people with the same x who entered the data at the same time, and one group is treated and the
other not. Let  be the span between the data-entering time point and the survey-ending time point.
Copyright  2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Appl. Econ. 20: 549–562 (2005)
552 M.-J. LEE AND S.-J. LEE
Matching on x and the data-entering time point te, the inequality (6) can be nonparametrically
estimated where  is the study-ending time point minus te. Since te and x vary across individuals,
(6) can be computed for different  and x, and a weighted average∫
fPy  jx, d D 1 Py  jx, d D 0gw, xddx
may be used as a marginal effect where w, x is a weighting function.
In clinical trials, subjects drop out because they are cured or because they perceive the treatment
ineffective; also possible is dropout caused by the treatment ‘pain/burden’ relative to the subject’s
patience. In our data, there are also dropouts from the job-training programmes. The reasons for
the dropouts, however, are not known in the data. Due to this problem, dropouts will not be used
in our analysis.
Section 2 describes the details of our data. Section 3 reviews the duration analysis methods for
equation (4), and provides our empirical findings. Section 4 reviews matching and applies it to
equations (5) and (6). Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. DATA DESCRIPTION
Our data consist of two sub-files from the Center for Employment Information in the Department
of Labor in South Korea: the job-training file for the T group and the unemployment-insurance file
for the C group. The C group is not a ‘no-training’ group; rather, they are the unemployed who
chose to receive unemployment insurance. Both files include only women with some records on
unemployment insurance premium payment; i.e., workers at firms/factories without ever paying
for unemployment insurance premium are not covered in the files. Among the women who became
unemployed in 1999, those who took job training and completed it by the end of 1999 and those
who received unemployed insurance benefit which ended by the end of 1999 are in our data set;
there are N1 D 5031 treated units and N0 D 47,060 control units. They are then followed up until
the end of March 2000; this short follow-up, decided by the Department of Labor, resulted in high
censoring percentages (71% for the T group and 72% for the C group).
Although an unemployed woman can choose d to some extent, she has to meet some criteria
to be eligible for unemployment insurance: paying for the insurance at least for 0.5 years is
required. For those ineligible women, self-selection for d is less worrisome because d D 0 is
ruled out by law. Unemployment insurance does not last for more than six months in general,
although there are exceptions depending on factors such as age and disability. Also, if one quits
her job voluntarily, she is not eligible for unemployment insurance in principle. The trainees
receive some compensation, the amount of which varies across the trainees. Roughly, the training
compensation is about $300 per month, and the unemployment insurance benefit is the minimum
of about $700 and 50% of the last workplace monthly wage. Thus, strictly speaking, the treatment
of interest in our data is a combination of job training, no unemployment insurance and training
compensation. That the C group receive substantially more money is likely to induce the C group to
stay unemployed longer than necessary [e.g., Meyer (1990), Røed and Zhang (2003)]; if anything,
our finding will be biased favourably for the T group.
Suppose we compare two women, one treated and one control. Matching on the quit/fired and
data-entering dates as well as on other covariates does two things: first, the two women searched
for jobs equally long before joining the study (and thus were equally frustrated); second, since they
Copyright  2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Appl. Econ. 20: 549–562 (2005)
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entered the data at the same time, we can compare them with 1[employed by 31/3/2000]. With
this response variable, the censoring poses no problem, because we know whether the women are
employed or not by 31/3/2000 regardless of the censoring. The training duration is included in the
unemployment duration; that is, a trainee is regarded as unemployed.
There are many different types of job training, of varying durations in days, as shown in Table I.
There were in fact more types of job training, but those with only a few trainees were removed
from the data. The definition of ‘service industry’ is not clear in the data source.
The aforementioned institutional facts along with self-selection led to visible differences in the
two groups as shown in the summary statistics of Table AI. As unemployment insurance requires
at least 0.5 years of paying premiums and gets paid longer as the premium-paying period gets
longer, the average age of the C group is higher (35) than that of the T group (28). The T group
is about one year more educated than the C group; for our later empirical analysis, six education
dummies will be used. Table AI also shows the job categories of the last workplace. About 83%
of the T group left their job voluntarily: 48% because of going self-employed, and 16% getting
married or having a baby; reasons such as getting injured, being old or hitting the job age-limit
are not entirely voluntary, although they are included in the ‘voluntary quitting’ category in the
data source. The reason for voluntary quitting is not known for 16% of the T group (‘personal
reasons’).
The row ‘ex-firm size’ shows the size (in persons) of the last workplace; 74% are under 500,
but due to some outliers of size more than 10,000, the SD of ex-firm size is huge. The duration
of work at the last workplace is 654 days for the T group on average, while it is 902 days for
the C group. The duration between the time point of losing the job and enrolling in a job-training
programme is about two months, whereas the duration between the time point of losing the job
and starting to receive unemployment insurance is about one month. In terms of the industry to
which the last workplace belonged (omitted in Table AI), manufacturing is leading with 38%
(31%) for the T (C) group, followed by retail/wholesale with 16% (11%), real-estate rental with
15% (14%), and finance/insurance with 7% (11%); the other industry categories are health-related,
construction, hotel/inn, transportation/warehouse, private education and public service.
Later, for estimation, we will drop the dummies for highschool (in education), machine
operator (in job), job age-limit (in reason), manufacturing (in industry), and textile (in training
type). Hence, the categories corresponding to the dropped dummies constitute the ‘base case’
unemployed woman.
Table I. Training types and durations
Training type Number of trainees Training duration
Textile 126 123
Machine/equipment 118 118
Information/communication 1151 107
Industrial application 274 150
Service industry 1728 138
Clerical/administration 820 108
Finance/insurance 88 74
Health-related 461 125
Copyright  2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Appl. Econ. 20: 549–562 (2005)
554 M.-J. LEE AND S.-J. LEE
3. PROPORTIONAL HAZARD AND ACCELERATED FAILURE TIME
3.1. Proportional Hazard and Weibull MLE
Suppose t1, q1, x1, . . . , tN, qN, xN are observed where ti is a continuous unemployment dura-
tion, and qi is a non-censoring indicator. As in Section 1, let ti D minyi, ci; ignore yji and di for
a while. Let t1  t2  Ð Ð Ð  tN without loss of generality. ‘Hazard’ , x of leaving the unem-
ployment state at time  given x is defined as , x  fjx/Sjx, where fyjx is a density
function for yjx and Sjx  Py > jx is the ‘survival function’. Then
, x D ∂ ln Sjx/∂, Sjx D exp
[

∫ 
0
s, xds
]
D exp, x
where , x  s0 s, xds is the ‘integrated or cumulative hazard’. ‘Proportional hazard’
specifies , x D o x, ˇ, where ot is the ‘base-line hazard’. The word ‘proportional’
comes from the fact that the function  x, ˇ changes the base-line hazard proportionally.
If yjx follows a Weibull distribution with parameters ˇo, x, then , x D ˇoˇo1x and
setting x D expx0ˇ we get
, x D ˇoˇo1 expx0ˇ ) , x D ˇo expx0ˇ 7
which is a proportional hazard with o D ˇoˇo1 and  x, ˇ D expx0ˇ. The role of a
regressor, say zi, with coefficient ˇz is to multiply ot by expziˇz. The Weibull MLE maximizes∑
i
fqi lnftijxi; bo, bC 1  qi ln Stijxi; bo, bg D
∑
i
fqi ln tijxi; bo, btijxi; bo, bg
for bo and b, which are for ˇo and ˇ. Later, for our data analysis, xi will be replaced by xi, di
and interaction terms of elements in xi and di; this will also be the case for the other estimators
in this section.
3.2. Cox Partial Likelihood Estimator (PLE)
Weibull MLE is restrictive in a number of aspects. First, proportional hazard may not hold.
Second, although specifying x as expx0ˇ is not controversial, specifying o as ˇoˇo1
is. Third, although irrelevant to our study, Weibull MLE is not flexible in allowing for time-
varying regressors. The last two shortcomings are overcome in the Cox partial likelihood estimator
(Cox, 1972).
Define (i ) as the ‘label’ for the person failing i th, not being censored, Rti as the ‘risk set’
at the i th failure (people surviving until just before the i th failure), and maintain the proportional
hazard with the exponential function as in Weibull MLE: t, xit D ot expxit0ˇ, where xi
is allowed to depend on t. The risk set Rti includes people who either failed or censored at or
after ti. The main idea of PLE rests on the likelihood of observing person i failing at t given a
risk set R(t) being
ot expxit0ˇ/
∑
j2Rt
fot expxjt0ˇg D expxit0ˇ/
∑
j2Rt
expxjt0ˇ
which is free of ot.
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Let M be the number of failure times (censoring times not counted). Since failure occurs only
at ti, the ‘partial likelihood’ function to maximize for b is
M∏
iD1

expxiti0b
/ ∑
j2Rti
expxjti0b

 8
The partial likelihood may be taken as a ‘regular’ likelihood; the asymptotic variance can be
estimated in the usual way for MLE.
3.3. Accelerated Failure Time (AFT)
In accelerated failure time, ln(duration) is specified as a linear function of x :
ln yi D x0i	 C ui
where 	 is a parameter vector, ui is independent of xi and eu has survival function S and cumulative
hazard function . Then, y D ex0	eu and
Py > jx D Peu > ex0	 jx D Sex0	 D expex0	
ex0	 accelerates or decelerates , which explains the name AFT. AFT is a special case of
‘transforming response’, where a transformation of yi other than lnyi can appear on the left-hand
side of the equation. But, as already mentioned, log-transformation renders a nice treatment effect
interpretation, and we will not explore other transformations.
The AFT interpretation requires independence of u from x ; otherwise, if u is related to x such
that eujx has survival function Sx and cumulative hazard x, then
Py > jx D Sxex0	 D expxex0	
x can influence the duration other than through ex0	 .
If there is no censoring, we can estimate the AFT linear model simply with a least squares
estimator (LSE) without specifying the error term distribution. To deal with the random censoring
problem, however, we will assume u ¾ N0, 
2u  independently of x for a constant 
2u > 0. Then,
we get an MLE maximizing, for g and su,
∑
i
(
qi ln
[

{ lnti x0ig
su
}
/su
]
C 1  qi ln
[
1 
{ lnti x0ig
su
}])
9
The AFT model has a number of advantages, compared with Weibull MLE and Cox PLE. First,
since we have a familiar linear model, we can try many well-known specification tests. Second,
suppose there is an unobserved variable, say vi. Such a variable appears in the form expx0iˇ C vi
for Weibull MLE and PLE, which makes both inconsistent, even if vi is independent of xi. For
AFT, vi can be simply absorbed into ui. With v in u, if there is no censoring, LSE for the
AFT linear model is consistent so long as CORx, u D 0; if MLE is used for censoring, then
independence of u from x (if not, a known form of dependence of u on x ) is required. Thus,
allowing for unobserved variables is much easier in AFT than in the hazard-based approaches; in
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the latter, various mixing distributions have been tried in the literature, but the resulting estimates
are sensitive to the chosen distribution [see Van den Berg (2001) and references cited therein].
Let xi include 1 as its first component as usual. Consider AFT models linear in xi and wi for
y0i and y1i, where wi consists of known functions of elements of xi:
lny0i D x0iˇx C ui, lny1i D x0iˇx C w0iˇw C ui, Euijxi, di D 0
) lnyi D x0iˇx C diwiˇw C ui, Euijxi, di D 0
where ˇx and ˇw are unknown parameter vectors. Observe
Eflny1 lny0jxg D w0ˇw ) Eflny1 lny0g D Ew0ˇw
which are conditional and marginal treatment effects, respectively. If w D 1, then the conditional
effect is the same as the marginal effect. Also, the conditional effect with w D Ew is equal to
the marginal effect.
3.4. Empirical Evidence
Table AII shows the results of the Weibull MLE, Cox PLE and AFT. Examining the Weibull MLE
and Cox PLE first, they are close in terms of signs, estimate magnitude and statistical significance.
This means that the Weibull distributional assumption may not be so bad after all. Given the
similarity and the fact that Cox PLE requires much weaker assumptions than Weibull MLE, we
will interpret only Cox PLE in the following.
For exp(est.) in Table AII, consider a dummy variable for college graduation with coefficient
0.535. This means that the hazard out of unemployment for college graduates is exp0.535 D
1.707 times the hazard for highschool graduates. For variables other than dummies, exp(est.) shows
the same type of proportional effect as the variable increases by one unit from a ‘reference level’
(for dummies, the reference level is zero). Table AII clearly shows that there are many significant
interaction terms. Unfortunately, interaction terms make the task of assessing covariate effects
complicated. Interaction or not, stating that the hazard increases by a certain percentage is less
palatable then stating that the duration increases by a certain percentage; we will be able to make
the latter type of statements with AFT later.
For us, the most important variables are d and its interaction terms. The treatment d itself shows
a negative effect: job training lengthens unemployment duration. It is possible, however, that this
negative effect gets reversed when interaction terms are taken into account. Some possibilities are
shown in Table II.
If an unemployed woman who worked in the transportation/warehouse industry is a professional
(job category) and receives a finance/insurance training, then her hazard out of unemployment is
2.44 times greater than the base case (machine operator in the manufacturing industry receiving a
textile training). If an unemployed woman who worked in the finance/insurance industry is a clerk
(job category) and receives a finance/insurance training, then her hazard out of unemployment is
1.88 times greater than the base case.
In Table AII on AFT, all signs are opposite to those in Cox PLE, which is natural, because
increasing hazard means decreasing duration. Age increases the duration: age and age ð education
carry positive numbers. Education decreases the duration as the dummies for junior college, college
and graduate school indicate; the effect, however, is mitigated by age. Among the reasons for
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Table II. Sub-populations with increased hazard out of unemployment
Sub-population Effect estimate
prof., trans./ware., fin./ins. exp1.334 C 0.459 C 0.808 C 0.960 D exp0.893 D 2.44
clerk, fin./ins., fin./ins. exp1.334 C 0.490 C 0.517 C 0.960 D exp0.633 D 1.88
Table III. Sub-populations with decreased duration
Sub-population Effect estimate
prof., trans./ware., fin./ins. 1.829  0.433  0.827  1.013 D 0.444
clerk, fin./ins., fin./ins. 1.829  0.477  0.600  1.013 D 0.261
Table IV. Sub-populations favourable for job training
Job executives, (semi-)pro., clerical, service/sales
Industry transportation/warehouse, fin./ins., private education, public service
Training type machine/equipment, info./communication, clerical., fin./ins.
getting unemployed, ‘self-employed’ and ‘marriage/baby’ increase the duration. The size of the
last workplace and the tenure there increase the duration. The unemployment duration before
entering the data also increases the duration.
Turning to the treatment, d has a big positive number: for the base case, job training increases the
duration, which corroborates the findings in Weibull MLE and Cox PLE. But when interactions are
taken into account, we can find combinations of job, industry and training type with the opposite
sign. Recalling the two sub-populations considered in Table II, their AFT effects are shown in
Table III. This table shows a 44% and 26% reduction in the unemployment duration.
Overall, judging from the interaction terms, the job, industry and training type categories in
Table IV seem to reduce the unemployment duration. It is interesting that while all advantageous
job categories are white-collar jobs regardless of industry categories, advantageous training types
are mixed. If one accepts the proposition that relatively more able workers are in white-collar jobs,
then this finding means that more able workers get employed faster. The training types presumably
reflect two things: one is the demand during the period 1999 to early 2000, and the other is the
effectiveness of training.
4. MATCHING AND GROUP-MEAN DIFFERENCES
Call treated woman i simply ‘case i ’. In matching, the goal is to select one or more similar
controls for case i. Sometimes this is done in two stages. In the first stage, some covariates are
matched exactly, perhaps because they are deemed important; this is done by making strata with
the covariates and considering only the controls in the same stratum as case i falls in. In the
second stage, a distance measure is used to select controls closest to case i using the covariates
not used in the first stage. If only the closest control is selected, we have a ‘pair matching’; if
more than one closest are selected, we have a ‘multiple matching’. A popular distance measure is
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the ‘Mahalanobis distance’: for case i, it is
xi  xm0C1N xi  xm m indexing the controls in the same stratum
where x is only for the second stage covariates and CN is a sample covariance matrix for x using
the C or T group.
It is possible that a case is passed over, if there is no reasonable match in the C group. If a
control is used to match only one case (to simplify the ensuing statistical analysis), then call the
matching ‘greedy’; otherwise, if a control is allowed to be matched multiple times, the matching
is ‘non-greedy’. If we start matching with case 1 and then proceed to case 2 and so on, then
the matching is ‘sequential’; otherwise, if all cases are considered jointly, then the matching is
‘non-sequential’. Clearly, non-sequential matching is better but hard to implement, for all N0N1
pairs should be considered jointly; for non-greedy matching, unless there is a limit on the number
of times a control can be matched, there is no reason to do non-sequential matching. Sequential
greedy matching is particularly simple, for the ‘control reservoir’ keeps shrinking as the matching
goes on.
Despite many different ways to do matching, getting the (asymptotic) variance for a treatment
effect estimator with matching is not easy. For pair matching, the treatment effect estimator is
AN  N1u
∑
i2Tuyi  ymi, where ymi is the matched control to case i, Nu is the number of used
cases and Tu denotes the group of used cases (recall that some cases may not be used if no good
match is found). Usually yi  ymi, i 2 Tu, are taken as iid, and VN  N2u
∑
i2Tufyi  ymi ANg2
is used as an estimator for the asymptotic variance. In principle, however, this variance estimator
needs a justification, because all controls are involved in matching, which implies dependence
across the pairs in the sum.
Pair matching is an extremely simple case. At the other end of the spectrum, there is (purely)
nonparametric matching using a weighted average of all controls for each case; the asymptotic
distribution is available in Heckman et al. (1998) when nonparametric kernel methods are used. For
the intermediate cases, there is no general asymptotic variance formula; each matching estimator
calls for the derivation of its own asymptotic variance, which is by no means easy.
Given the huge sample size in our data, we will use two pair-matching schemes that are easy to
implement. One is sequential greedy, and the other is sequential non-greedy; the only difference
is that the latter allows a control to be matched multiple times. The former is simpler, but the
latter tends to balance covariates better at the cost of a higher SD, as Abadie and Imbens (2002)
state. In sequential non-greedy pair matching, however, multiple use of the same control units
would make it harder to justify the asymptotic variance estimator VN. Abadie and Imbens (2002)
derive the asymptotic distribution for sequential non-greedy matching when x is continuous and
the number of matched controls is identical for all cases.
In our x, most variables are dummies; these dummies were matched exactly. Among the non-
dummy variables, six dummies were used for education and ex-firm size. For education, the six
categories are primary school graduation, middle school, high school, junior college, college and
graduate school; for ex-firm size, 1–10, 11–50, 51–100, 101–300, 300–500 and 500C (the last
category 500C includes large conglomerates of size 10,000 or above). These dummies for education
and ex-firm size were also matched exactly.
For given strata determined by the dummies, age and job experience at the last workplace were
used for Mahalanobis distance. We also included the duration between the time point of losing the
job and enrolling in job training (or receiving unemployment insurance) in Mahalanobis distance,
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Table V. Matching evaluation
After matching Before matching
Greedy Non-greedy T C t-Value
T C t-Value T C t-Value
Age 27.7 28.4 6.1 27.8 28.1 2.9 27.8 34.9 76.8
Job exp. (yrs) 1.83 1.89 1.4 1.79 1.76 0.9 1.79 2.47 21.4
Last unemp. dur. (days) 65.1 53.3 11.0 65.0 58.1 7.1 65.1 33.6 41.1
because this duration may alter the reservation wage of the unemployed: a longer duration may
frustrate the woman and make her more willing to take a given job offer. Also, for inequality (6),
the time point at which one enrolls in a job-training programme or starts to receive unemployment
insurance was matched: we counted dates with 1 January 1999 as 1 until the end of March 2000,
and the date variable was used also for Mahalanobis distance.
The two pair-matching schemes are evaluated in Table V by comparing the mean values of
the covariates used for Mahalanobis distance. Non-greedy matching does slightly better than
greedy matching. Although there are still some differences left after matching between the two
groups, the differences are much smaller compared with before matching and seem to be negligible
economically.
All but the last rows of Table AIII show the treatment effects (6) in the left half and (5) in
the right half for various sub-populations listed in the first column. The right half shows that the
treatment increases the duration for all sub-populations considered; from the last row, the marginal
(or average) effect is about 40 days, which is significant. But as already mentioned, this finding
does not use the censored observations.
Turning to the left half of Table AIII, there, all censored observations are used. For most sub-
populations, the employment effect is negative, ranging approximately from insignificant 0.04
(health training) to significant 0.15 (service training). But there are also some positive effects,
ranging approximately from significant 0.04 (information/communication training) to significant
0.15 (finance/insurance training). Recall that the training duration for finance/insurance training is
only 74 days, which is much shorter than the average training duration of about 120 days; this
may explain why finance/insurance training was successful. For the entire population, the last
row for the marginal effect shows significant negative numbers 0.064 and 0.073: job training
decreases employment probability by about 6–7%.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we assessed job-training effects on Korean women for the period January 1999
to March 2000. We used a number of different measures of job-training success, and different
estimation methods accordingly. Despite some discrepancies across the results using the methods,
clear common findings emerged: overall, job training increased unemployment duration and,
as such, needs fixing. Looking at the reason why, job training seemed too long relative to its
effectiveness in placing the trainees. It is, however, possible that job training may contribute by
extending the future employment duration, once employed; but to check this out, more data are
needed. Despite the overall gloomy picture painted in this paper on job-training effects, there
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are some sub-groups for which job training decreased unemployment duration: for ex-job types,
they are white-collar workers regardless of industries; for training types, finance/insurance and
information/communication. At least, this shows which groups of ex-job and training types the
government should target to improve job-training outcomes.
APPENDIX
Table AI. Summary statistics
Treatment group Control group t-Value
Mean SD Mean SD
Age (years) 27.789 5.566 34.924 10.815 76.75
Education (years) 13.070 1.760 12.128 2.505 34.42
Job: executive 0.003 0.051 0.010 0.101 9.13
Job: professional 0.034 0.182 0.040 0.195 2.05
Job: semi-professional 0.063 0.243 0.057 0.232 1.56
Job: clerical 0.458 0.498 0.505 0.500 6.33
Job: service/sales 0.144 0.351 0.102 0.303 8.17
Job: mechanic 0.156 0.363 0.104 0.306 9.62
Job: machine operator 0.018 0.132 0.014 0.117 1.97
Job: menial labour 0.124 0.330 0.167 0.373 8.53
Voluntary quitting 0.825 0.379 0.084 0.278 134.84
Reason: self-employed 0.477 0.500 0.022 0.146 64.34
Reason: marriage/baby 0.160 0.367 0.014 0.117 28.11
Reason: injured/old 0.035 0.184 0.030 0.171 1.51
Reason: personal 0.156 0.362 0.004 0.064 29.52
Reason: job age-limit 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.120 26.42
Ex-firm size (persons) 1070 3760 840 3277 2.23
Job experience at ex-firm (days) 653.9 806.6 901.5 481.1 21.4
Unemployment duration before enrollment (days) 65.1 53.2 33.6 32.5 41.1
Table AII. Weibull MLE, Cox PLE and AFT
Weibull MLE Cox PLE AFT
est. tv est. tv exp(est.) est. tv
1 4.896 60.75 – – – 4.159 47.59
Age 1.590 2.24 1.566 2.21 0.548 2.785 3.99
Primary school 0.764 3.97 0.748 3.89 0.473 0.457 2.44
Middle school 0.168 1.88 0.160 1.80 0.852 0.036 0.41
Junior college 0.461 11.53 0.452 11.33 1.571 0.396 9.74
College 0.547 7.45 0.535 7.30 1.708 0.419 5.71
Graduate school 0.797 5.01 0.792 4.98 2.207 0.645 3.81
Age ð edu 0.235 3.95 0.229 3.86 0.725 0.128 2.20
Job: executive 0.589 5.29 0.585 5.26 0.557 0.696 6.00
Job: professional 0.571 7.38 0.568 7.35 0.566 0.602 7.06
Job: semi-professional 0.476 6.46 0.481 6.54 0.618 0.553 6.79
Job: clerical 0.567 8.66 0.569 8.70 0.566 0.610 8.34
Job: service/sales 0.684 9.49 0.688 9.57 0.503 0.741 9.45
Copyright  2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Appl. Econ. 20: 549–562 (2005)
JOB-TRAINING EFFECTS ON KOREAN WOMEN 561
Table AII. (Continued )
Weibull MLE Cox PLE AFT
est. tv est. tv exp(est.) est. tv
Job: mechanic 0.432 6.35 0.428 6.29 0.652 0.422 5.63
Job: menial labour 0.129 1.94 0.137 2.05 0.872 0.156 2.12
Reason: self-employed 0.191 3.22 0.157 2.64 0.855 0.209 3.42
Reason: marriage/baby 0.514 5.62 0.506 5.54 0.603 0.462 5.49
Reason: injured/old 0.021 0.38 0.031 0.56 0.970 0.053 0.97
Reason: personal 0.231 1.91 0.230 1.91 1.259 0.252 1.91
Ex-firm size 0.063 11.46 0.060 11.08 0.984 0.049 12.08
Job experience 0.044 6.19 0.041 5.73 0.897 0.043 5.81
Pre-unemployed duration 0.004 11.75 0.004 13.11 0.876 0.004 13.15
Industry: construction 0.016 0.46 0.020 0.58 0.980 0.039 1.02
Industry: retail/wholesale 0.142 4.64 0.151 4.93 0.860 0.156 4.84
Industry: hotel/inn 0.398 6.45 0.409 6.63 0.665 0.358 6.20
Industry: trans./warehouse 0.841 17.74 0.825 17.55 0.438 0.861 20.78
Industry: finance/ins. 0.645 16.52 0.638 16.44 0.528 0.674 17.94
Industry: real-estate rental 0.111 4.37 0.104 4.10 1.110 0.116 4.18
Industry: private education 0.679 11.84 0.679 11.90 0.507 0.697 12.43
Industry: health-related 0.159 4.00 0.162 4.08 0.850 0.156 3.71
Industry: public service 0.383 7.05 0.383 7.06 0.682 0.397 7.27
d 1.365 3.15 1.334 3.08 0.263 1.829 4.17
dð job: executive 0.999 1.76 0.976 1.72 2.654 0.909 1.48
dð job: professional 0.455 1.54 0.459 1.56 1.583 0.433 1.44
dð job: semi-professional 0.383 1.40 0.393 1.44 1.482 0.403 1.45
dð job: clerical 0.482 1.92 0.490 1.95 1.632 0.477 1.90
dð job: service/sales 0.445 1.67 0.452 1.70 1.571 0.437 1.65
dð job: mechanic 0.262 1.01 0.262 1.01 1.299 0.236 0.91
dð job: menial labour 0.098 0.38 0.113 0.44 1.120 0.119 0.46
dð industry: construction 0.067 0.50 0.072 0.54 1.074 0.059 0.40
dð industry: retail/wholesale 0.045 0.46 0.052 0.53 1.053 0.065 0.63
dð industry: hotel/inn 0.232 1.15 0.241 1.19 1.273 0.230 1.13
dð industry: trans./warehouse 0.826 4.77 0.808 4.66 2.243 0.827 4.46
dð industry: finance/ins. 0.526 3.86 0.517 3.79 1.676 0.600 4.41
dð industry: real-estate rental 0.066 0.77 0.064 0.75 0.938 0.051 0.54
dð industry: private education 0.368 2.33 0.380 2.41 1.463 0.475 2.93
dð industry: health-related 0.076 0.54 0.083 0.59 1.086 0.123 0.86
dð industry: public service 0.333 1.89 0.336 1.91 1.400 0.456 2.50
dð training: machine/equipment 0.598 2.34 0.579 2.27 1.785 0.675 2.61
dð training: info./commun. 0.609 2.83 0.590 2.74 1.804 0.608 2.95
dð training: industrial application 0.001 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.999 0.028 0.12
dð training: service 0.294 1.35 0.292 1.34 0.747 0.249 1.21
dð training: clerical 0.485 2.22 0.465 2.13 1.592 0.497 2.38
dð training: finance/ins. 0.998 3.77 0.960 3.63 2.612 1.013 3.68
dð training: health 0.281 1.24 0.277 1.22 1.320 0.281 1.28
dð reason: self-employed 0.263 2.74 0.221 2.31 1.248 0.244 2.40
dð reason: marriage/baby 0.012 0.08 0.003 0.02 1.003 0.015 0.11
dð reason: injured/old 0.080 0.44 0.074 0.40 0.929 0.018 0.10
dð reason: personal 0.262 1.71 0.267 1.74 0.766 0.292 1.76
dð ex-firm size 0.067 8.05 0.064 7.78 1.003 0.052 6.21
dð job experience 0.046 2.30 0.047 2.38 0.886 0.030 1.65
dð age 1.199 1.74 1.200 1.74 0.631 0.013 0.02
dð edu 0.040 2.19 0.038 2.11 1.012 0.037 1.90
dð pre-unemployed duration 0.003 4.27 0.003 4.43 1.077 0.003 4.69
˛ 0.931 – – – – – –
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Table AIII. Treatment effects with matching
Employment-or-not-effect Duration effect (days)
Greedy Non-greedy Greedy Non-greedy
est. tv est. tv est. tv est. tv
Middle school 0.175 3.622 0.139 3.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
High school 0.061 5.398 0.083 7.385 43.5 9.148 52.6 11.250
Junior college 0.074 3.527 0.069 3.374 51.4 8.434 47.8 8.079
College 0.002 0.102 0.005 0.252 29.5 4.548 32.7 5.215
Job: professional 0.047 0.988 0.053 1.120 31.2 1.654 38.0 2.084
Job: semi-professional 0.051 1.314 0.074 2.007 20.3 1.688 29.0 2.583
Job: clerical 0.061 4.490 0.048 3.598 45.8 10.60 47.5 11.14
Job: service/sales 0.053 2.443 0.057 2.676 39.2 4.104 438 4.724
Job: mechanic 0.031 1.343 0.110 4.995 47.3 4.665 58.5 6.169
Job: machine operator 0.145 2.257 0.048 0.759 43.1 1.248 38.3 1.107
Job: menial labour 0.069 2.775 0.107 4.306 39.3 4.038 46.1 4.781
Training: textile 0.079 1.558 0.143 2.671 48.8 1.865 48.8 1.865
Training: machine/equip. 0.051 0.869 0.051 0.869 34.7 1.825 34.7 1.825
Training: info./commun. 0.049 2.525 0.037 1.908 34.8 6.372 34.7 6.398
Training: indus. appl. 0.107 2.818 0.099 2.643 80.4 7.092 83.9 7.358
Training: service 0.141 10.16 0.158 11.36 64.9 8.979 71.1 9.881
Training: clerical 0.044 1.928 0.046 2.097 22.7 3.417 29.4 4.476
Training: finance/ins. 0.148 2.028 0.159 2.166 6.6 0.459 6.641 0.459
Training: health 0.038 1.295 0.047 1.583 46.8 4.165 48.1 4.264
Marginal effect 0.064 20.66 0.073 23.57 38.8 2.894 44.2 9.164
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